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COUNTR	25 2 1	REPORT NO. 25X1
TOPIC_	The state of the s	
EVALUAT	ATION 25X1 PLACE OBTAINED	25X1
	OF CONTENT End of November 1949	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
	DETAINED 25X1 DATE PREPAR	FD 3 February 1950
	ENCES	
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25.4.1	1. Press reports on this disaster are much exagg victims. This figure may be increased by those this cannot be proved, as all German doctors to prevent any leakage of information on 2. It is certain that the accident originated in shaft No 31. (There is no shaft No 35.) Exce to catch fire, which immediately spread to the was sucked into the mine by the natural air flators, which only later were switched off. were affected. Fork could not be resumed for 3. Many German employees were arrested immediate vinced that there had been sabotage. Some of held. Annoying and awkward interrogations by Tress reports on this accident are mainly bas Telegraf", which were copied by the other new Comment: Comment: First information on the mine disaster in JOH November 1949.	were replaced by Russian doc- the effects of the catastrophe. the winding engine shop of ssive overload caused the cable edried planking. The smoke low, as well as by the venti- Thus, all levels of Object No I more than a week. ly, the Russians being con- the Germans are still being the NVD have not yet ended. ed on reports of the "Berliner spapers.
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	This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States. Next Review Date: 2008	25X1

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